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Abstract 
This study explores the ways in which selected principles contained within America’s Declaration of Independence 
are addressed in works of post-Declaration literature. The examined works are from the nineteenth-century. It was 
during this time that America’s writers were attempting to establish a uniquely American literature, and the 
Declaration of Independence, with its rhetoric of equality and unalienable rights, provided a fertile ground for that 
effort. Drawing upon scholarship from the document itself, I discuss the Declaration and provide a brief explication 
of the principles contained within the preamble. I then compare and contrast how those same principles are 
incorporated and interpreted in passages from Ralph Waldo Emerson’s essay, The American Scholar; Nathaniel 
Hawthorne’s novel, The House of Seven Gables; and Henry David Thoreau’s essay, Resistance to Civil Government. 
The purpose of the study is to demonstrate how important political ideas and values become infused into public 
consciousness and rooted into cultural identities by way of artistic medium. The results indicate a significant 
influence of the political ideas embodied within the Declaration upon the selected works.  
Introduction 
America’s Declaration of Independence articulated and codified an evolving body of political philosophy 
whereby the old system of monarchical rulers, self-legitimized by long-held constructs of heredity and divine right, 
collapsed under the influence of new and enlightened ways of thinking—concepts of natural rights, equality, and 
individualism. It became, in a sense, a manifesto for the value and dignity of all people and their right to self-
government. In an effort to establish a uniquely American literary tradition, American writers of the nineteenth 
century employed the principles of the Declaration as motifs in their writings, at times using them to advance a 
particular social critique or as benchmarks with which to measure the ills and injustices they observed in the world 
around them.  
This study explores the ways in which selected principles contained within the Declaration of 
Independence are addressed in various works of American post-Declaration literature. Drawing upon scholarship 
from the document itself, I discuss the Declaration—its significance, object, sources of influence, and the principles 
embodied within the opening paragraph and the preamble. I then compare and contrast how those principles are 
incorporated and interpreted in passages from each piece of literature, along with what impact, if any, the context 
has upon how the principle is interpreted. In the course of my discussion I shall demonstrate to the reader that the 
public narratives which animate American political culture are at the very least impelled not necessarily by 
philosophical treatises or official state documents, but in part by art and literature. Capture the imagination, as 
literature surely does, and the mind will follow. 
The Significance of the Declaration 
In the heat of active conflict with what was at the time the greatest military power on the globe, the 
Declaration was conceived as an instrument by which the colonies might assume a “separate and equal station […] 
among the Powers of the Earth” (U.S. Declaration of Independence) and thereby enter into treaties and alliances 
with those Powers willing to aid the American cause. It was the essential document of the American Revolution, 
announcing “the emergence of a new actor (‘one people’) on the international stage” (Armitage). Yet due at least in 
part to the elegant articulation of the revolutionary principles it embodies, the Declaration quickly transcended its 
importance as the essential document of the Revolution to become what Thomas Jefferson termed “an instrument 
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pregnant with our own, and the fate of the world” (Jefferson, Writings 1516), an instrument that would ultimately 
inspire others to petition for rights long denied, and that would serve as the philosophical framework and inspiration 
for a number of evolving states in the centuries to come.  
It wasn’t just Jefferson and his fellow patriots who understood the historical significance of the American 
Revolution and the Declaration. Across the Atlantic in that very nation with which the colonies sought “to dissolve 
the Political Bands” (Declaration) connecting them, Edmund Burke wrote: 
 
A great revolution has happened—a revolution made, not by chopping and charging of power in any one of 
the existing states, but by the appearance of a new state, of a new species, in a new part of the globe. It has 
made as great a change in all the relations, and balances, and gravitation of power, as the appearance of a 
new planet would in the system of the solar world. (William 453) 
 
Indeed it was that very newness, that uncharted territory of the American Revolution and its signature 
Declaration, which proved essential in allowing America’s founders to put forth new ideas concerning the rights and 
dignity of the individual and the proper role of government—ideas that would galvanize and inspire American 
writers of the nineteenth-century.  
The Object of the Declaration 
The main imperative in drafting the Declaration of Independence was to allow Americans to escape the 
dangerously vilifying epithet of rebellious colonies, and instead present themselves to the world as a newly 
sovereign nation under siege and in need of assistance—to “become legitimate belligerents outside the British 
Empire rather than to remain rebels within it” (Armitage). The case had been building for some time, ever since 
George III declared the colonists to be in open rebellion and committed a large armada “to put a speedy 
end”(McCullough 11) to the uprising. John Adams worried how being branded by George as “traitors” engaged in a 
“desperate conspiracy” (McCullough 10) would affect American representatives: “Would not our Proposals and 
Agents be treated with Contempt?” (Armitage), he asked. Another patriot, Thomas Paine, voiced similar concerns in 
his pamphlet Common Sense, when he wrote “the custom of all Courts is against us, and will be so, until by an 
Independence, we take rank with other Nations” (Paine 77). Among others, Adams and Paine were concerned not 
only with America’s prestige and ability to negotiate trade agreements, but the very real and urgent concern of 
having to confront the full might of British military power with no foreign assistance whatsoever. That would not be 
necessary, however, as the Declaration of Independence announced America’s arrival as an equal player on the 
world stage able to negotiate its own treaties and alliances.  
In order to better understand the logic of the document and how it argues its case for the necessity of 
independence and the right to international recognition, Stephen E. Lucas breaks the Declaration down as a 
deductive argument in syllogistic form:  
 
Major premise:    When government deliberately seeks to reduce the people under absolute   despotism, the 
people have a right, indeed a duty, to alter or abolish that form of government and to 
create new guards for their future security.   
Minor premise:    The government of Great Britain has deliberately sought to reduce the American people 
under absolute despotism. 
Conclusion:          Therefore the American people have a right, indeed a duty, to abolish their present form 
of government and to create new guards for their future security. (Lucas) 
 
Although the Declaration was written with practical considerations in mind, it was much more than just an 
expedient with which to garner political and military support. From the political philosophies of men such as John 
Locke, to the town halls and pulpits of New England, “harmonizing sentiments” (Jefferson, Writings 1501) were 
afloat about the nature of rights and the proper role of government. Just as the vast American landscape provided 
seemingly endless frontiers to be explored, American society provided a political and philosophical frontier 
unencumbered by centuries of entrenched traditions and structures of power. Thomas Jefferson expressed this 
sentiment almost forty-eight years after the Declaration was adopted when he wrote that, “our revolution […] 
presented us an album on which we were free to write what we pleased. We had no occasion to search into musty 
records, to hunt up royal parchments, or to investigate the laws and institutions of a semi-barbarous ancestry. We 
appealed to those of nature, and found them engraved upon our hearts” (Jefferson, Writings 1491). Thus, in drafting 
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the document that would irreversibly launch thirteen colonies into nationhood and a perilous but seemingly 
unbounded future, Jefferson inscribed the principles and phrases that not only reflected a revolution in thought that 
had been evolving for decades prior to the events of 1776, but that would reverberate in the minds and writings of 
generations to come. 
The American Mind: Sources of Influence  
By the time Jefferson was charged by the Committee of Five with drafting the Declaration, a growing 
number of colonists had been persuaded of the unavoidability of independence. A cascade of events—Acts and 
Resolutions, mutual enmities, and preparations for war on both sides of the Atlantic—served to make independence 
a virtual fait accompli, as the minds of many Americans had made an about-face regarding their duties to the Crown. 
John Adams later reflected that “[t]he Revolution was in the minds and hearts of the people; a change in their 
religious sentiments of their duties and obligations. […] This radical change in the principles, opinions, sentiments, 
and affections of the people, was the real American Revolution” (Adams 282-83). It was precisely that revolution in 
the “minds and hearts of the people” that made possible the breaking of those “Political Bands.” If events had gone 
just a bit more his way, George III indeed might have put a speedy end to the rebellion as planned, but he had 
already lost the most important prize of all, the hearts and minds of the American people.  
From an historical perspective, so new and unique were the conditions that existed in the colonies, so 
untried were the ideas and principles which animated the evolving American mind, that the Declaration dawned a 
new era. It served as a melting pot of recent experiences and new ideas, of philosophical influences distilled to their 
most logical core and taken to the apex of rhetorical potency. Jefferson puts it thusly: 
 
This was the object of the Declaration of Independence. Not to find out new principles, or new arguments, 
never before thought of, not merely to say things which had never been said before; but to place before 
mankind the common sense of the subject, in terms so plain and firm as to command their assent, and to 
justify ourselves in the independent stand we are compelled to take. Neither aiming at originality of 
principle or sentiment, nor yet copied from any particular and previous writing, it was intended to be an 
expression of the American mind, and to give to that expression the proper tone and spirit called for by the 
occasion. All its authority rests then on the harmonizing sentiments of the day, whether expressed in 
conversation, in letters, printed essays, or in the elementary books of public right, as Aristotle, Cicero, 
Locke, Sidney, etc.(Jefferson, Writings 1501) 
 
Just what was this American mind, and what were the influences that spawned it? The singular experience 
of crossing the Atlantic to begin anew in a vast wilderness, unencumbered by the suffocating legacy of “musty 
records” and “royal parchments” endowed the colonist with a certain disposition of independence and self-reliance 
that proved fertile ground for the political philosophies of John Locke and classical liberalism. Michael Zuckert 
writes that “[t]he new order of the ages was possible in part because the new world supplied far greater opportunity 
for something like a new beginning”(Zuckert 5). Indeed, in his Letters from an American Farmer, J. Hector St. John 
De Crèvecoeur seems to capture that new beginning of the pre-Revolution American character. In America, 
Crèvecoeur writes, “[w]e are all animated with the spirit of industry which is unfettered and unrestrained, because 
each person works for himself. […] Here are no aristocratical families, no courts, no kings, no bishops, no 
ecclesiastical dominion, no invisible power giving to a few a very visible one…” Here in this “great American 
asylum” (Crèvecoeur 67-68), was a melting pot of many nations “whose labours and posterity will one day cause 
great changes in the world”(Crèvecoeur 70). While Crèvecoeur’s idyllic vision of bucolic America would become 
sullied by the mutual suspicions, enmities, and acts of violence between neighbors brought about by the Revolution, 
his characterizations nonetheless point to an American whose character, once separated from the suffocating yoke of 
European monarchies and able to experience the rewards of industry and self-reliance for the first time, became 
conversant with the ideas and principles that would become the Declaration of Independence.  
While the American mind was at least in part being formed by the frontier experience, Zuckert argues a 
strong case for John Locke as the predominate source of philosophical inspiration, forcefully concluding that “Locke 
inspired the Declaration and that it has a basically Lockean meaning”(Zuckert 40). As one of many examples of the 
principles informing the “harmonizing sentiments” upon which Jefferson drew, in his Second Treatise of 
Government Locke reasons that “[t]he state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges everyone: and 
reason, which is the law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one 
ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions” (Locke 9). When we turn to Jefferson’s original 
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draught of the Declaration we read the following: “We hold these truths to be sacred and undeniable; that all men 
are created equal & independent, that from that equal creation they derive rights inherent & inalienable, among 
which are the preservation of life, & liberty, & the pursuit of happiness” (Jefferson, Papers 423). Notice Jefferson’s 
replication of the phrase “equal and independent,” his use of the words “life” and “liberty,” and that he logically 
derives “inherent & inalienable” rights from the status of “equal creation.” Indeed, evidence of Lockean influence is 
further bolstered upon noting Jefferson’s comment that the “trinity of the three greatest men that have ever lived, 
without any exceptions, [where] Bacon, Locke, and Newton” (Jefferson, Writings 939).  
All of these sources of influence, when combined, contributed to the formation of  Jefferson’s “American 
mind,” setting the philosophical stage and providing the “harmonizing sentiments” for what Stephen E. Lucas calls 
“perhaps the most masterfully written state paper of western civilization” (Lucas).  
The Foundational Principles of the Declaration of Independence 
In order to grasp the principles contained within the Declaration one must first grapple with the concept of 
natural law. It inherently and diametrically opposes Jonathon Winthrop’s notion that men [humans] are “ordained to 
be unequal” (Winthrop), which would have to mean that people enter into civil society already in a state of 
“ordained” inequality. Yet, the equality that exists within the scheme of natural law does not mean that all people in 
a pre-civil state are equal with regards to physical attributes, intellectual abilities, and things of that sort; rather, it 
means that “all men [humans] are created free and independent [and that] no one of them should be dependent on 
the will [or authority] of another” (Zuckert 33). At its very core this concept is antithetical to the centuries of divine 
right and birthright which preceded Locke’s Second Treatise. It is from the presupposition of natural law and the 
“harmonizing sentiments” of the day, therefore, that the principles of the Declaration’s Preamble emanate 
seamlessly.  
The most effectual and systematic approach with which to explore those principles contained within the 
Preamble is by way of Lucas’s interpretation. Building logically from the premise of natural law in the introductory 
paragraph of the Declaration, he presents the principles as five propositions whereby each follows deductively from 
the previous until the final proposition justifies the essential philosophical purpose of the Declaration: 
 
Proposition 1:      All men are created equal 
Proposition 2:      They [all men, from proposition 1] are endowed by their creator with certain unalienable 
rights.  
Proposition 3:      Among these [mean’s unalienable rights, from proposition 2] are life, liberty, and the 
pursuit of happiness 
Proposition 4:      To secure these rights [man’s unalienable rights, from propositions 2 and 3] governments 
are instituted among men 
Proposition 5:      Whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends [securing mans’ 
unalienable rights, from propositions 2-4], it is the right of the people to alter or to 
abolish it. (Lucas) 
 
Although not explicitly stated, nested within these propositions is the indispensable principle of 
individuality. In order for the above principles to make any kind of sense the importance of the individual as a 
sovereign and irreducible moral agent is essential. In order for the words equal or unequal to have any real meaning 
when applied to people, there must first be individuals, and each individual must be independent and have 
ownership over him or herself. Likewise, unalienable rights are endowed upon each individual as a matter of 
individual birthright, not as a function of belonging to any group or to a majority faction, and emphatically not as a 
bequeathal from civil government.  
The principle of being born equal would seem to obliterate all forms of aristocracy. Indeed it does prove 
fatal to artificial aristocracies—those forms deriving from man-made constructs of divine right and birthright. But 
while according to natural law theory in a pre-political state no one individual is endowed with the authority to rule 
over another, in a civil state it is to the advantage of all society if those who are most endowed with certain talents 
are allowed to flourish in those talents and use them in ways that benefit not only themselves but their fellow 
citizens. These are natural aristocracies, and they may include any number of talents which apply to various 
occupations, including government offices. While initially derived from the status of having been created equal, the 
concept is also linked to the right of the pursuit of happiness—the notion that each individual should have the liberty 
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to discern his or her talents and virtues and to develop them to their fullest, unfettered by artificial or arbitrary 
restraints.   
It is with this understanding of the Declaration of Independence in mind that we turn to three writers of 
nineteenth-century literature in search of its principles: Ralph Waldo Emerson, Nathanial Hawthorne, and Henry 
David Thoreau. 
The Literature 
Emerson’s intellectual Declaration of Independence 
Oliver Wendell Holmes once pronounced Ralph Waldo Emerson’s The American Scholar as “our 
intellectual Declaration of Independence” (Cheever 34). Indeed, using words that mirror the sentiments of 
America’s Declaration, Emerson cautions his readers that “[w]e have listened too long to the courtly muses of 
Europe” and that “[o]ur day of dependence, our long apprenticeship to the learning of other lands, draws to a close” 
(Emerson 1150). The colonies had successfully declared their political independence and claimed their separate but 
equal station as a new nation, now it was time for America to take its separate and equal station as a cultural and 
intellectual force.  
Emerson finds in nature the source of those laws which govern the human mind when he writes that “The 
first in time and the first in importance of the influences upon the mind is that of nature” (Emerson 1139). In nature 
only, according to Emerson, does one discover the analogues to the laws of his mind. This bears a strong corollary 
with Jefferson’s “Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God” (Declaration) in which are rooted the necessary and proper 
prerequisites for government. Emerson sees God’s laws, manifest in nature, as discernible through reason, and 
cautions against depending upon the interpretations of others—what he calls “other men’s transcripts of their 
readings” (Emerson 1142). For Jefferson, “other men’s transcripts” might very well have been whatever apologetics 
kings, nobles, and priests employed in order to justify their superior positions, the very sort of transcripts that the 
Declaration pronounces null and void. And while Emerson’s views were more pantheistic than Jefferson’s in that he 
regarded nature and the human mind as “analogues,” the important similarity is that both men rejected the notion 
that man, any man, whether it be a European monarch or a European writer, has the authority to write the scripts by 
which others must define themselves, either politically or intellectually. Those scripts (laws), are available equally 
for all to discern and live by, through nature. “We will walk our own feet,” writes Emerson; “we will work with our 
own hands; we will speak our own minds” (Emerson 1150).  
Within the logic of nature’s laws is the centricity of the individual and the axiom that no individual is born 
with inherent authority over others, whether divine or inherited. In The American Scholar, Emerson elevates the 
individual. He writes that:  
 
Another sign of our times, also marked by an analogous political movement is, the new importance given to 
the single person. Every thing that tends to insulate the individual,―to surround him with barriers of 
natural respect, so that each man shall feel the world is his, and man shall treat with man as a sovereign 
state with a sovereign state [created equal];―tends to true union as well as greatness. (Emerson 1150)  
 
The “analogous political movement” Emerson refers to, combined with the “new importance given to the 
individual,” is the “real American Revolution” distinguished by John Adams and codified by Jefferson in the 
Declaration of Independence. It is also noteworthy that in these lines Emerson captures the essence of Jefferson’s 
interpretation of natural law—that in a pre-political state each man (person) is sovereign and independent with 
respect to authority over his own person and property.   
In the Preamble of the Declaration the principle that all Men [humans] are created equal takes logical 
preeminence as the first proposition. Within the schema of the Declaration not only has the individual risen to a 
position of primacy but, at least in spirit, the haughty have been demoted while the lowly have gained a measure of 
respect. At the very least they are no longer the default inferiors to kings and nobles. Although this point is not 
expressly stated in the Declaration it certainly is on the mind of its author in his proposed Bill for the More General 
Diffusion of Knowledge, and in several of his personal letters. In the Bill, Jefferson states that in order to promote the 
public happiness, those “whom nature hath endowed with genius and virtue” should receive a liberal education so 
that they will be equipped to “guard the sacred deposit of rights and liberties of their fellow citizens,” and that “they 
should be called to that charge without regard to wealth, birth or other accidental condition or circumstance” 
(Jefferson, Writings 365). “Worth and genius would thus have been sought out from every condition in life,” he 
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writes in a letter to John Adams (Jefferson, Writings 1308). The notion that the lowest members of society, if 
endowed with sufficient “genius and virtue,” should be not only allowed to move up from their class but assisted in 
doing so, was in itself a revolutionary idea.  
Although Emerson does not refer to or even acknowledge instances of innate genius within the poor, or the 
necessity of providing educational opportunities for them—set free by the equalizing sentiments of the Declaration 
the common people are nonetheless lifted, if only modestly, from the shadows of society, such that their lives are 
now regarded as a reservoir of untapped subject matter for American literature. “I ask not for the great, the remote, 
the romantic,” Emerson writes, as if in rebuke to the aristocratic tone and subject matter of European and many early 
American writers, “[t]he literature of the poor, the feelings of the child, the philosophy of the street, the meaning of 
household life, are the topics of the time. […] I embrace the common. I explore and sit at the feet of the familiar, the 
low.” The created equality of the Declaration, implying an equal dignity and common spirit to all, rings through 
Emerson’s words as he continues: “show me the sublime presence of the highest spiritual cause lurking, as it always 
does lurk, in these suburbs and extremities of nature […] there is no trifle; there is no puzzle; but one design unites 
and animates the farthest pinnacle and the lowest trench” (Emerson 1149). It is no longer only the well-born and the 
wealthy who merit interest as worthy subjects for American writers, the time has come for the common and the 
everyday to assume their rightful place in the American imagination, an imagination that has been prepared for just 
such a change in perspective by certain self-evident truths.  
Nathaniel Hawthorne’s aristocracy 
Although there are no explicit references to aristocracy in the Declaration, the concept is inextricably 
nested within the logic of natural law. Thomas Jefferson agreed with John Adams that a natural aristocracy exists 
and that it is grounded in “virtue and talents,” which is “the most precious gift of nature for the instruction, the 
trusts, and government of society” (Jefferson, Writings 1305-06).  In that same letter Jefferson also discusses what 
he refers to as “artificial aristocracy” (Jefferson, Writings 1304), an aristocracy that is not based upon “virtue and 
talents” but is “founded on wealth and birth,” (Jefferson, Writings 1306) the type of aristocracy that binds 
generations into perpetual monopolies of power, wealth, and influence. Such monopolies are inherently hostile to 
the notions that “all Men [people] are created equal” and that governments “derive their just Powers from the 
Consent of the Governed” (Declaration). Artificial aristocracies imply that selected persons are born “booted and 
spurred” and require no general consent. Within the schema of natural law, however, no person is naturally endowed 
with the right to rule over another, whether by divine right or by birthright. Much like the “separate and equal 
Station” to which all nations are entitled, all persons, by way of “Nature and Nature’s God” have equal sovereignty 
over their own lives, liberties, and happiness. Governments, therefore, are instituted not at the pleasure of any self-
entitled class of “kings, nobles, or priests” (Jefferson, Writings 859), they are instituted in order to secure the natural 
rights of each and every individual such that those whose virtues and talents might enable them to excel and self-
actualize are free to do so.   
In his novel The House of Seven Gables, Nathaniel Hawthorne evokes a rather distinct correlation with the 
Jeffersonian view that traditional, or artificial, aristocracies are a “mischievous ingredient in government” 
(Jefferson, Writings 1306) and a detriment to society in general. Throughout the text, the Pyncheon family bears a 
resemblance to that same old-style “artificial” aristocracy referred to by Jefferson. Within the current generation of 
Pyncheons in the story, Jasper Pyncheon, the “Judge,” is involved in local politics, wielding his influence with an air 
of entitled authority, deceptively brutish at its core, and comingled with a patronizing charm. The other living 
Pyncheon, one whose natural virtues and talents provide a clear contrast to the imperious pride of the Judge and 
previous generations of Pyncheons, is young Phoebe. By way of her meritorious character and her effect upon the 
House of Seven Gables and its inhabitants, Hawthorne suggests that there is a natural aristocracy that benefits all, 
wherever it dwells. This is precisely Jefferson’s assertion, that a natural aristocracy consisting of those who by birth 
possess superior virtue and talent will benefit all of society if allowed to flourish. However, as the story progresses 
the messages contained with Hawthorne’s narrative diverge from some Jeffersonian concepts; such as his assertion 
that “the earth belongs to each [generation], (Jefferson, Writings 960), that “it may be proved that no society can 
make a perpetual constitution or even a perpetual law,” and that “[e]very constitution, then, and every law, naturally 
expires at the end of 19 years. It be enforced longer, it is an act of force and not of right” (Jefferson, Writings 963). 
Indeed, as we follow the development of the novel’s two main characters, Phoebe Pyncheon and Holgrave Maul, 
Hawthorne’s position appears to be that the ideal society is not one in which laws and constitutions periodically 
expire, but one in which there exists a blending of those institutions that provide some degree of healthy stability, 
along with the virtue and talents of natural aristocracy.  
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As the story progresses the character of Holgrave likewise progresses from being in sympathy with 
Jefferson’s perspectives to being in relative opposition to them. The characterizations of Holgrave at first suggest an 
excessive democratic zeal, but as Holgrave changes and mellows, he become less zealous and more traditional. For 
example, in a letter to John Adams, Jefferson wrote that “[t]he earth belongs always to the living generation. They 
may manage it then, and what proceeds from it, as they please” (Jefferson, Writings 963). Early in the story we find 
a remarkably similar perspective expressed by Holgrave. During a conversation with Phoebe he echoes those same 
sentiments as “it seemed to Holgrave […] that in this age, more than ever before, the moss-grown and rotten Past is 
to be torn down, and lifeless institutions to be thrust out of the way, and their dead corpses buried, and everything to 
begin anew” (Hawthorne 124-25). The narrator then tells us that this wholesale approach to change, of tearing down 
everything from the past, is not the way of the world, and that Holgrave’s “error lay in supposing that this age, more 
than any past or future one, is destined to see the tattered garments of Antiquity exchanged for a new suit, instead of 
gradually renewing themselves by patchwork” (Hawthorne 125). Not all traditions are oppressive, Hawthorne 
implies. Not every institution is “rotten and lifeless.” Some are certainly worth preserving and others might best be 
incrementally reformed and improved upon rather than summarily tossed aside. Holgrave will eventually come to 
realize that some institutions are truly venerable, that having been tested and refined over the course of generations 
they are in the best interest of the people, increasing their security and happiness with a minimum of discomfort or 
inconvenience. Another example is when early in the story, Holgrave echoes the sentiments of Jefferson as he insists 
to Phoebe that it “were better that they [public edifices] should crumble to ruin once in twenty years, or thereabouts, 
as a hint to the people to examine into and  reform the institutions which they symbolize” (Hawthorne 127). But in 
his democratic zeal, Holgrave doesn’t want to reform institutions, he wants them “torn down” and their “dead 
corpses buried.” He wants “everything to begin anew.” This is not the patchwork reform that Hawthorne alludes to 
and seems to think is best, and later in the story Holgrave himself is reformed such that he finally sees the value of 
some degree of institutional stability. Phoebe is dismayed at Holgrave’s attack on all structure and tradition and lets 
him know it. “How you hate everything old,” she retorts, “It makes me dizzy to think of such a shifting world!” 
(Hawthorne 127). As the story evolves, however, Phoebe becomes the primary advocate and impetus for what will 
become Holgrave’s more sensible approach towards institutions and tradition.    
As the only child of the deceased Arthur Pyncheon and with the other surviving Pyncheons being childless, 
Phoebe is the last in the family line. Yet the brash aristocratic nature of her Puritan ancestors, that “bold, imperious, 
relentless, crafty” (Hawthorne 85) nature that seemed to pervade each successive generation, is nowhere to be found 
in Phoebe. Having been raised in the country by her non-Pyncheon mother and step-father, her aspect is one of a 
“kind of quiet dignity” (Hawthorne 51). For Phoebe, the dreariness and drudgery of daily tasks “[have] the easy 
charm of play” (Hawthorne 56). She values tradition and self-reliance. In short, Phoebe is the embodiment of 
Jefferson’s natural aristocracy, those who by way of their gifts of talent and virtue rise up to become the guardians 
of individual liberty and republican institutions.  
The initial tension between Phoebe and Holgrave arises from their differing views on the value of 
tradition—whether it be family, community, or political. Phoebe finds comfort and value in those institutions and 
traditions which provide for social stability and human happiness, while Holgrave, in his democratic zeal, would tear 
them down “once in twenty years, or thereabouts” with no regard whatsoever to their relative value or function. His 
is a radical rebelliousness against anything even faintly resembling the old aristocracy. Yet there is danger in 
Holgrave’s zeal. In Federalist Paper No.10, James Madison observes that “pure democrac[ies], [that species of 
democracy embraced by Holgrave], have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found 
incompatible with personal security or the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives as they 
have been violent in their deaths” (Hamilton 76). As if speaking directly about Holgrave, Madison warns that those 
who “have erroneously supposed that by reducing mankind to a perfect equality in their political rights, they would 
at the same time be perfectly equalized and assimilated in their possessions, their opinions, and their passions” 
(Hamilton 76). Those such as Holgrave who advocate for such a scheme forget that when left unchecked by 
institutional safeguards, majorities can be just as tyrannical of individual rights as the most villainous despot.  
Eventually Holgrave begins to embrace an appreciation and reverence for the sovereignty of the individual. 
After mesmerizing the beautiful Phoebe into a trance he resists the opportunity of “acquiring empire” over the girl’s 
“good, pure, and virgin spirit” (Hawthorne 147). This is the beginning of a fundamental change in the young man. 
Phoebe changes as well, as her unrestrained optimism and naivety becomes tempered by her experiences at the 
House of Seven Gables. Upon witnessing an episode of rancorous discord between family members whom she had 
always looked up to, she begins to have doubts about whether other persons of “eminent stamp” might, “at any 
single instance, be otherwise than just and upright.” Her naivety is shaken, yet true to her natural virtues, she 
maintains a “quiet dignity” and compassion towards others. In the chapter titled “The Flower of Eden,” in which 
they both confront the reality of Jaffrey Pyncheon’s corpse, Holgrave comes to full appreciation of Phoebe’s natural 
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aristocracy when he tells her: “gentle as you are, and seeming to have your sphere among common things, you yet 
possess remarkable strength. You have wonderful poise, and a faculty which, when tested, will prove itself capable 
of dealing with matters that fall far out of the ordinary rule” (Hawthorne 211). The “strength” and “poise” of Phoebe 
has had a mediating effect upon Holgrave. He is no longer “ill at ease,” but realizes the benefits of laws and society.  
His admiration and affection for Phoebe have melted away his previously cynical nature and replaced it with a more 
balanced disposition towards all that she represents.  
In love with Phoebe, Holgrave now has something tangible to venerate and protect. He sees the value of 
stability and tradition. The transformation from a man obsessed with the faux equality of pure democracy to a man 
informed by the more reasoned tenets of republicanism is complete as he tells Phoebe that “[t]he world owes all its 
onward impulses to men ill at ease. The happy man inevitably confines himself within ancient limits. I have a 
presentiment that, hereafter, it will be my lot to set out trees, to make fences—perhaps, even, in due time, to build a 
house for another generation—in a word, to conform myself to laws, and the peaceful practice of society. Your poise 
will be more powerful than any oscillating tendency of mine” (Hawthorne 215).  
Thus we have a marriage between the best of both worlds: democratic man checked and balanced by the 
mitigating restraints of tried-and-true institutional safeguards, and a natural aristocracy to protect against any 
“oscillating tendency” and to act as the protector of individual liberties. If we read closely between the lines of The 
House of Seven Gables we can almost hear Hawthorne advising Jefferson to temper his zeal for wanting to keep 
liberty fresh and vital; that there are surely some laws and institutions that ought not to be torn down every twenty 
years or so, and that there are surely some that ought not to be torn down ever.  
Henry David Thoreau and moral duty 
Before the “prevailing sentiments” that formed the philosophical groundwork of the Declaration, duty to 
society and government, not rights, was the overwhelming priority of civil societies. Previous generations of 
government were loathe to even consider, much less institute, any generalized right to rebellion. Such a thing was 
unheard of, and certainly ran counter to any notions of divine right. The American Declaration’s bold assertion of 
the right to alter or abolish was, as Zuckert states, “a novelty” (Zuckert 100), introducing a radical about-face from 
centuries of divine right and unquestioned fealty to ruling authorities—right or wrong. Although the Declaration 
admittedly does not have the force of law, for the first time in history a government had conditioned its very 
existence upon the consent of the people, conferring upon them the right to revolt if the government became 
“destructive of the Ends” by which all legitimate forms of governments are instituted—which is to secure the 
natural and unalienable rights of the people. In addition, what is particularly remarkable about the Declaration is that 
according to its precepts, governments “do not ‘derive’ their power once and for all at some originating moment” 
(Zuckert 28-9). Power is held contingently upon the ongoing consent of the governed with its moral authority held 
continually in balance. This was certainly the view of Henry David Thoreau when he wrote his essay Resistance to 
Civil Government.  
 In his essay, Thoreau makes a clear reference to America’s Declaration when he writes that “[a]ll men 
recognize the right of revolution; that is, the right to refuse allegiance to and to resist the government, when its 
tyranny or its inefficiency are great and unendurable” (Thoreau 1859). The tyranny that Thoreau found “great and 
unendurable” was the perpetuation of slavery in America and the Mexican War. He makes his contempt for slavery 
and the war very clear when he writes, “when a sixth of the population of a nation which has undertaken to be the 
refuge of liberty are slaves, and a whole country is unjustly overrun and conquered by a foreign army, and 
subjugated to military law, I think that it is not too soon for honest men to rebel and revolutionize” (Thoreau 1859). 
But Thoreau was not advocating taking up arms or burning down the house of government. His notion of the phrase 
“rebel and revolutionize” is more nuanced, as were his feelings about the government itself. In his essay 
“Disobedience and its Objects,”  A. John Simmons identifies two motives for civil disobedience that are “perfectly 
justifiable” and which often guide the actions of those who engage in it: “the desire to frustrate evil […] and the 
desire to avoid complicity in injustice or wrongdoing” (Simmons 1808). In Resistance to Civil Government, Thoreau 
is motivated by both of these objectives.  
To say that Thoreau is a proponent of limited government is an understatement. To him, government is “at 
best but an expedient” (Thoreau 1857). It is not the source of rights as the Declaration confirms. Rights are endowed 
by the “Creator” as an inherent and inseparable part of being born human. Nor is government in any way the source 
of moral authority—that too comes from the same “Creator” who endows all humans with certain rights. 
Government is a means, a mere “expedient” through which the will of the people is expressed. But “the world is not 
governed by policy and expedient” (Thoreau 1870) says Thoreau. The world, in his estimation, is governed, or at 
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least ought to be, by a “fountain-head” (Thoreau 1871) of truth from which even the Bible and the Constitution 
derive their authority. It is here, at this same fountain-head from which flow the laws of nature and the unalienable 
rights in the Declaration, that humans must measure the actions of their government and the orientation of their 
souls. To blindly follow the law, though rooted in the Constitution, is to be dismissive of that fountain-head and 
derelict to one’s essential moral duty. Taking a cynical view, Thoreau writes that to regard the Constitution, “with 
all its faults,” as one of those “very admirable and rare things, to be thankful for,” one must necessarily see it “from 
a lower point of view” (Thoreau 1870). He is no doubt referring to the United States Constitution’s accommodation 
to slavery: the Three-Fifths Clause, the Migration and Importation Clause, the Fugitive Slave Clause, and the 
Prevent Clause in Article V. Much as government itself, the Constitution is a mere expedient, and law, says 
Thoreau, “never made men a whit more just” (Thoreau 1858). If the law, or the government, is to become an agent 
of the evil and injustice of slavery, majority opinion notwithstanding, then Thoreau “cannot for an instant recognize 
that political organization as [his] government which is the slave’s government also” (Thoreau 1858). He admits to 
no feelings of duty or loyalty to the American government, especially in light of the evils of the Mexican War and 
the perpetuation of slavery. Thoreau’s sense of duty is to a higher source, to that same God of nature referred to in 
the Declaration. Yet he does not wish to devote himself to eliminating the wrong, only that he “wash his hands of it 
[…] and not give to it practically his support” (Thoreau 1862). The purpose of his disobedience, therefore, is not to 
become a crusader for the overthrow of government, but to “avoid complicity in injustice or wrongdoing,” and 
convince his fellow citizens to do the same.   
Recognizing that some government is necessary, Thoreau asks for “not at once no government, but at once 
a better government” (Thoreau 1858), a government that operates upon the highest moral principles and not the rule 
of the strongest. And democratic majorities are not the solution. Thoreau declares that a government in which the 
majority rules “in all cases cannot be based on justice” (Thoreau 1858). If the majority of citizens are in favor of 
slavery does that make it just? Is any law just simply because it has been anointed by the majority? Much as James 
Madison acknowledges in Federalist No. 10, that a majority “actuated by some common impulse of passion, or 
interest, [may very well effect laws and actions which are] adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent 
and aggregate interests of the community” (Hamilton 72), Thoreau does not see majority rule as necessarily 
grounded in virtue and justice. Democratic majorities, viewed so often as the end-all of modern civil governments, 
are no guarantee against oppression. Instead, he seems to say that moral authority carries more legitimacy than 
majority opinion when he calls upon abolitionists to “effectively withdraw their support, both in person and property 
[taxes], from the government of Massachusetts, and not wait till they constitute a majority of one,” reminding his 
fellow citizens that “any man more right than his neighbors, constitutes a majority of one already” (Thoreau 1863). 
What Thoreau is saying here is that once a man has searched his soul and found within it the moral truth endowed 
by his God, that moral truth is all the legitimacy he needs to act with confidence. Moral right transcends democratic 
majorities, and when a law requires one to be “the agent of injustice to another, then, [Thoreau says] break the law” 
(Thoreau 1863).  “Action from principle” (Thoreau 1862), he declares, charging himself with the responsibility of 
making sure that he does not “lend” himself in any way to “the wrong” which he “condemn[s]” (Thoreau 1863). 
This, of course, he does by refusing to pay taxes and spending a well-known night in jail for his refusal. Not 
supporting what he feels is an illegitimate government by withholding paying taxes is precisely what Thoreau 
suggests his fellow citizens do.  
After going to considerable lengths to point out the limitations of democratic majorities in the final 
paragraph of the essay, Thoreau accedes to the idea that democracy is at least more respectful of the individual than 
a “monarchy” or a “limited monarchy” (Thoreau 1872). But further improvements are necessary, in his view. Even 
democracy is not the end-all of governmental regimes, and citizens must not be lulled into thinking it is. Instead, 
they must learn to go beyond the ballot box in holding their government accountable. Thoreau’s ideal system seems 
to be one in which the individual is unquestionably sovereign and supreme, one in which the wellspring of political 
power from which all governmental authority is continuously derived and whose authority over any citizen can, by 
rights, be withdrawn and rescinded at any time by that citizen whenever an appeal to higher truth and morality show 
the government left wanting. Michael Zuckert puts it well: “The rightful power to unmake and remake government 
is the strongest and most persistent token of the inalienability of rights” (Zuckert 25). Indeed it is essential if natural 
law and government by consent are to have any meaning whatsoever. No doubt Thoreau would add the power to 
withhold one’s support, whether in the form of taxes or otherwise, and the power to engage in non-violent civil 
disobedience.  
 
 
90 
 
Conclusion 
In his Speech at Independence Hall on February 22, 1861, Abraham Lincoln proclaimed: “I have never had 
a feeling politically that did not spring from the sentiments embodied in the Declaration of Independence” (Lincoln 
705). Aside from being the “most masterfully written state paper of western civilization,” America’s Declaration of 
Independence has arguably been the most influential state paper as well. Although the United States Constitution is 
highly esteemed and aspects of it are frequently modeled, the Declaration, with its soaring rhetoric of rights and 
equality, has captured the imaginations of countless people since that fateful day in July of 1776 that catapulted 
Thomas Jefferson to the summit of historical figures. The principles of the Declaration have deeply colored the 
thinking and writing of those on the forefront of rights movements—from Elizabeth Cody Stanton’s Declaration of 
Sentiments at the Seneca Falls Convention in 1849, to Frederick Douglas’s What to the Slave Is the Fourth of July? 
speech, to Martin Luther King’s famous speech from the steps of the Lincoln Memorial over one-hundred years 
later. For over two centuries the words and principles of the Declaration have provided both the benchmark and the 
inspiration for freedom and fundamental human rights.  
The literary works examined in this essay are a small, but important, sampling of the American writers 
whose works contain the influence of the Declaration’s principles. Herman Melville, Margaret Fuller, and Walt 
Whitman are some others, and one could certainly find many more. The role these writers played, and still play, in 
inculcating new ideas and issues into the minds of their readers, while not precisely measurable, is no doubt 
substantial. “Law requires, art inspires,” as Steven Olsen-Smith so aptly puts it (Olsen-Smith), and an inspired 
reader is a more receptive and actively engaged reader. Capture the imagination, as the literature of America’s 
nineteenth-century writers surely did and still does, and the mind, along with certain values and perspectives, will 
follow. 
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